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1555 
EVALUATING CANDIDACY RESTRICTIONS: THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF NEW YORK’S MODIFIED APPROACH 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
Walsh v. Katz1 
(decided June 2, 2011) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Daniel Ross appealed from a decision of the Appel-
late Division, Second Department which upheld the constitutionality 
of a residency requirement mandating that the fifth member of the 
Southold town board, an elected position, reside on Fishers Island.2  
In reaffirming the constitutionality of the statutory provision, the 
New York Court of Appeals held that the impact of the residency re-
quirement on the Southold residents’ voting rights was incidental and 
minimal, and as such a rational basis standard of review, rather than a 
strict scrutiny standard, was appropriate.3  Applying this standard, the 
court further held that the residency requirement was rationally relat-
ed to a legitimate state interest4 and thus did not offend the Equal 
Protection Clauses of either the New York or United States Constitu-
tions, which are similar in their breadth and wording.5 
This Note examines the Court of Appeals’ decision in Walsh 
v. Katz and its implications on the New York courts’ approach to 
constitutionally suspect election laws.  Part II analyzes the court’s 
treatment of the appellant’s contentions, and argues that its failure to 
 
1 953 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 Id. at 756.  Fishers Island is a small, sparsely populated, and unconnected island within 
the town of Southold. 
3 Id. at 759. 
4 Id. at 755.  The main purpose of the residency requirement is to assure adequate repre-
sentation in town government for the island’s residents.  Id.  The legislative rationale as laid 
out in the “Laws of 1977” notes that because of the island’s “unique geographical position,” 
the Fishers Island board member is intended to act as a link between the island and the town 
government.  Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 755. 
5 Id. at 758, 760. 
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account for cautionary language in cited cases constituted an overly 
deferential posture.  Part III surveys the federal approach to residency 
requirements, and election laws generally, which exhibits varying in-
terpretations on how to approach the issue, in particular, disagree-
ment over what Anderson v. Celebrezze6 and its progeny entail for the 
treatment of challenged election laws.  Part IV analyzes the court’s 
modified approach to this issue as exhibited in Walsh and suggests a 
variation of the approach that further incorporates the flexibility of 
the Anderson analysis.  Part IV.A tests the modified approach against 
the facts of Walsh, examining its implications.  It posits that an overly 
deferential posture and the resultant oversight of factual considera-
tions may have led the court to a different, and less meritorious, deci-
sion.  Part V concludes by suggesting that in spite of the court’s legis-
latively deferential posture, its reliance on the Anderson analysis 
allows for greater malleability in future challenges, which may be 
successful if that test’s analytical flexibility is shrewdly employed. 
II. THE OPINION 
Appellant Ross’s constitutional claims arose from his bid for 
the dual town justice/town board member seat that was reserved for a 
resident of Fishers Island, which he was not.7  The petitioners in the 
suit brought an action to prohibit Ross from placing his name on the 
ballot based on his lack of residency.8  Ross counterclaimed to have 
his candidacy petition validated, and also challenged the constitution-
ality of the residency requirement.9 
The Suffolk County Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, 
ruling that Ross had until thirty days after his election to obtain resi-
dency on Fishers Island.10  On appeal, the Appellate Division modi-
fied the lower court order to require that Ross obtain residency upon 
taking the seat on the Town Board.11  Addressing Ross’s constitu-
tional claims, the Appellate Division held that a rational basis stand-
 
6 Anderson, 460 U.S. 780.  Addressing challenges to Ohio’s early filing requirement for 
independent candidates, the Court in Anderson enunciated a novel “balancing analysis” that 
it used it lieu of the traditional Equal Protection analysis.  Anderson’s progeny exhibits disa-
greement over the proper application of the analysis. 






Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 28
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/28
2013] EVALUATING CANDIDACY RESTRICTIONS 1557 
ard was applicable and that the residency requirement was justified 
by the existence of such a rational basis.12  Ross appealed from the 
portions of the Appellate Division order that upheld the constitution-
ality of the residency requirement and the court’s use of a rational ba-
sis standard in deciding that issue.13  Although Ross eventually lost 
the election, the court retained the issue as a declaratory judgment 
proceeding.14 
A. Appellant’s Contentions: Standard of Review, 
Constitutional Claims, and Application of the 
Former to the Latter 
Ross had three contentions, all of which were resolved against 
him by the court.  The first was the threshold issue of the appropriate 
standard to apply in determining whether the residency requirement 
was unconstitutional: rational basis or strict scrutiny.15  Ross argued 
that a strict scrutiny standard was applicable because the statutory 
provision affected fundamental interests, namely the right to vote and 
the right to run for public office.16  In response, the court deemed the 
latter interest non-fundamental.17  The second contention was the al-
leged constitutional violation, which was predicated upon two sub-
claims: first, that the residency requirement was violative of equal 
protection guarantees because it reserved one seat on the town board 
for a small segment of the larger population, thereby limiting the 
population’s voting interests; and second, that the designation of one 
seat to a resident of Fishers Island created a district within the town 
and catered to the interests of a few residents over the whole, effec-
tively diluting votes and offending State and Federal Equal Protection 
Clauses.18  Finally, Ross argued that the legislative justifications for 
the requirement were neither “compelling” nor supported by any “ra-
 
12 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 756. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  Additionally, Ross claimed that his right to vote was being unconstitutionally bur-
dened by the residency requirement.  Id. 
15 Id. at 756-57. 
16 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 757. 
17 Id. at 758 n.2 (“Strict scrutiny has been held applicable to ballot access cases involving 
restrictions based on wealth or restrictions that impose special burdens on new or small polit-
ical parties or independent candidates.” (citing Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611, 613 (N.Y. 
1990))). 
18 Id. at 757. 
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tional bases.”19 
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
The court relied almost entirely on United States Supreme 
Court decisions throughout its opinion.  Prior to beginning its analy-
sis, the court illustrated the nearly identical wording of the federal 
and New York Equal Protection clauses and stated that the New York 
clause is as broad as the federal clause.20  Consequently, New York’s 
analytical framework in approaching this issue is a synthesis of dif-
ferent federal approaches.  Its implementation of that framework, 
however, is its own. 
The first issue that the court undertook was the determination 
of the appropriate standard of review.21  It prefaced its analysis of this 
issue by emphasizing the fundamental importance of the right to vote 
under the Federal Constitution, but with the caveat that voting rights 
and rights of political association were subject to limitations.22  Rely-
ing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson,23 the court stated 
that “whether the [voting regulation] governs the registration and 
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or 
the voting process itself, [the regulation] inevitably affects, at least to 
some degree, the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate 
with others for political ends.”24  Thus, subjecting every electoral 
regulation to a standard of strict scrutiny could significantly impede a 
state’s ability to run its elections efficiently because of the rigor that a 
 
19 Id.  The words “compelling” and “rational bases” are terms of art in the Constitutional 
dynamic.  The former accompanies a “strict scrutiny” standard of review, characterizing the 
type of interest that the state must be seeking to regulate.  The latter defines what is required 
to support a “rational basis” standard of review, namely justifications that appear rationally 
related to advancing the state interest. 
20 Id. 
21 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 756-57. 
22 Id. at 757.  Limitations on the right to vote are essential to the proper exercise of that 
right.  See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (“But the right to vote is the right to 
participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of 
the democratic system.”); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (“Common sense, as well as constitu-
tional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring 
elections; ‘as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are 
to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the demo-
cratic processes.’ ” (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))). 
23 460 U.S. 780, 788. 
24 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 757 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
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statute must undergo to satisfy that standard.25 
Having recognized the legitimate interest that a state has in 
regulating its electoral procedures, the court stressed the need for a 
balance between this interest and the fundamental right to vote, 
which is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.26  As 
such, the appropriate standard of review, when faced with a challenge 
to a state election law, is predicated upon a consideration of the ex-
tent to which the law impinges upon First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections and, if the injury appears more than minimal, find-
ing a compelling state interest to justify that invasion.27  As the Court 
of Appeals stated, “a court’s inquiry into the propriety of a state elec-
tion law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation di-
rectly infringes upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”28  In 
applying this principle, the court relied on another Supreme Court 
case, Bullock v. Carter,29 to delineate the mechanics of its applica-
tion.30  The court reasoned that although provisions affecting the right 
to run for office have an incidental effect on the right vote, such indi-
rect and minimal effects do not by themselves compel a strict scruti-
ny standard of review.31  Supplementing this notion was the court’s 
statement that the right to run for a public office is not fundamental.32 
Having established a rational basis as the standard for its con-
tinued review, the court addressed Ross’s claim that the residency re-
quirement impermissibly diluted votes by creating a district within an 
“otherwise at-large town election system.”33  The court rejected this 
argument by applying the reasoning that it used in addressing the is-
sue of the appropriate standard of review, and also by drawing on 
 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 758. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  The word “inquiry,” as used in this context, and standard of review are analogous. 
29 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).  Bullock concerned high filing fees for candi-
dates seeking to run in the Texas primary elections.  The Supreme Court held that the limit-
ing effect of these fees on possible candidates resonated significantly enough with voters’ 
rights so as to justify a more stringent standard of review, ultimately invalidating the law as 
violative of equal protection guarantees. 
30 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143 (“[L]aws that affect candidates al-
ways have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. Of course, not every limita-
tion or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of 
review.”). 
31 953 N.E.2d at 758. 
32 Id. (citing Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611 (N.Y. 1990)). 
33 Id. at 757. 
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analogies to two similar Supreme Court cases, Dusch v. Davis34 and 
Dallas County v. Reese.35 
Applying a rational basis standard of review, the court 
weighed the injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
against the state justification for the law.36  It reasoned that because 
all voters were able to vote for the Fishers Island seat and the regula-
tion was based on a legitimate state interest, the law was neither dis-
criminatory nor unreasonable.37  Further, the court addressed con-
cerns that although the votes are not actually diluted, the residency 
requirement may confer more influence to this smaller segment of the 
population by giving the island its own representative.38  In resolving 
this issue, the Court relied on two notions: the first was the fact that a 
candidate running for the Fishers Island seat would not have to estab-
lish residency on the island until after that person had won the elec-
tion, thereby leaving an opportunity for a non-Fishers Island resident 
to run for the seat, although not hold it;39 the second was the idea that 
“elected officials represent all of those who elect them, and not mere-
ly those who are their neighbors.”40  The court further supplemented 
this reasoning by examining the two United States Supreme Court 
cases mentioned previously, Dallas County and Dusch, which both 
concerned Equal Protection Clause challenges to residency require-
ments. 
C. Dusch and Dallas County: Unheeded Warnings 
Dusch concerned the apportionment of an eleven-member city 
council in which four of its members were elected without regard to 
their residency and the remaining seven were required to be residents 
of each of the city’s seven boroughs.41  The populations of these bor-
oughs ranged from less than 1,000 to almost 30,000.42  The petition-
ers contended that this apportionment plan amounted to an unequal 
 
34 387 U.S. 112 (1967). 
35 421 U.S. 477 (1975). 
36 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 759. 
40 Id. (quoting Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 480). 
41 Dusch, 387 U.S. 112. 
42 Id. 
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representation of the city’s voters.43  The Supreme Court, however, 
disagreed, noting that the plan made “no distinction on the basis of 
race, creed, or economic status or location.  Each of the 11 council-
men [was] elected by a vote of all the electors in the city.”44  Further, 
each vote held equal weight on all the candidates, which the Court 
deemed as an incentive for the candidates to act in the interest of all 
the voters, rather than only those in their districts.45 
In Walsh, the Court of Appeals also relied on this notion, alt-
hough it did not address the admonishments that followed the lan-
guage in Dusch.  Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that “the pre-
sent consolidation plan uses boroughs in the city ‘merely as the basis 
of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation;’ ”46 and 
further, its caveat that “[i]f a borough’s resident on the council repre-
sented in fact only the borough, residence being only a front, differ-
ent conclusions might follow.”47 
In Dallas County, an equal protection challenge was brought 
against a statutory provision that required each of the four members 
of the county commission to reside in each of the four residency dis-
tricts.48  The claim was predicated on the fact that although the four 
districts had significantly disproportionate population densities, each 
nevertheless had to have one of its residents serving on the commis-
sion.49  Upholding the validity of the residency requirement, the Su-
preme Court reasoned, as the Court of Appeals did in Walsh, that 
when “an official’s ‘tenure depends upon the countywide electorate[,] 
he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the coun-
ty, and not merely those of people in his home district.’ ”50 However, 
the Court in Dallas made a distinction between the districts being 
used as merely a basis for the candidates’ residency and having them 
function in a representative manner, hinting that the latter may be in-
appropriate.51 
In Walsh, the Court of Appeals did not address this warning 
 
43 Id. at 113. 
44 Id. at 115. 
45 Id. 
46 Dusch, 387 U.S.at 115 (quoting, in part, Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965)) 
(emphasis added). 
47 Id. at 116. 
48 Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 477. 
49 Id. at 478. 
  50 Id. at 479-80 (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at 438). 
  51 Id. at 480. 
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from Dallas, even though the Southold legislative notes on the resi-
dency requirement indicated that it was meant to give Fishers Island 
residents special representation on the town board.52  The Court of 
Appeals relied on the idea that because all voters may partake in the 
Fishers Island election their votes were not diluted.53  However, it 
seems that the importance of the “one vote, one person”54 concept 
used by the court is in its assurance of equal representation, and hav-
ing a special representative for a small segment of the population, 
contradicts the principle underlying this concept. 
The Court of Appeals’ failure to reconcile the cautionary lan-
guage in Dusch and Dallas with the facts of Walsh, specifically the 
residency requirement’s representational intent,55 exhibited an overly 
deferential posture.  Unequal representation was a glaring concern in 
Dusch and Dallas, yet the Court of Appeals gave the issue minimal 
treatment.  Faced with a claim of unequal representation, the issue’s 
resolution, at a minimum, demanded assessing the requirement’s 
modern necessity, considering that the legislation was over thirty 
years old and predicated on a lack of communication with the main-
land.  Moreover, as this Note will illustrate, the court had the tools to 
undertake a more thorough analysis.56  In the aggregate, these factors 
signal that greater explication was necessary.  The court’s failure to 
properly consider the foregoing factors likely resulted in an incorrect 
decision. 
III. FEDERAL APPROACH 
When assessing a constitutional challenge to a state election 
law that limits ballot access, federal courts are primarily concerned 
with the effects that such limitations may have on voters’ rights.57  
Absent any substantial effect on voting rights, the court will under-
take a less rigorous evaluation of the challenged law as it tries to bal-
ance state and individual interests.58  Further, while a candidate’s 
 
  52 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 755. 
  53 Id. at 759. 
  54 Id. at 758 (stating that Ross’s reliance on “one person, one vote” principle in apportion-
ment cases is misplaced because those cases had the effect of diluting votes, resulting in un-
equal voting power). 
  55 Id. at 755.  
  56 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
  57 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786. 
  58 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). 
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right to run for office is not treated as fundamental,59 the Supreme 
Court has held it to be as important as the state’s interest in regulating 
its electoral process, stating that “[t]his legitimate state interest, how-
ever, must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unneces-
sarily burden either a minority party’s or an individual candidate’s 
equally important interest in the continued availability of political 
opportunity.”60  Thus, an election law limiting ballot access, notwith-
standing any effect that it may have on voters’ rights, will not likely 
pass constitutional muster if it appears arbitrary or “not reasonably 
necessary to the accomplishment of the State’s legitimate election in-
terests.”61  In instances where the electoral impediment was a resi-
dency requirement, with challenges often arising out of a requisite 
durational period attached to the residency and alleged dilution of 
votes, the courts’ analyses have been no different.62  Because of the 
collateral effects that candidacy requirements invariably have on vot-
ing rights, courts have deemed the rigor of their inquiry to be predi-
cated upon the extent to which a regulation encroaches on constitu-
tional interests.63 
Starting from this base, the Supreme Court in Bullock empha-
sized the importance of realistically considering candidacy re-
strictions in light of their impact on voters.64  Restrictions that im-
pinge too far upon voters’ rights require a greater degree of scrutiny 
and compelling state justifications.65  The Court’s decision in Bullock 
 
  59 Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142-43 (“[T]he Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental 
status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.”). 
  60 Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716. 
  61 Id. at 718.  See also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970) (finding no reasonable 
state interest in the requirement that members of county board of education be freeholders).  
Although a standard of review was not explicitly enunciated by the Court, it is likely apply-
ing an “intermediate” standard of review, which falls between the “rational basis” and “strict 
scrutiny” standards.  Such a standard has been applied where the state interest was “im-
portant,” the benefits of the means used were substantially related to the interest, and the 
burden to be overcome was characterized as “not substantially more burdensome than neces-
sary.” R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Relat-
ed Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and 
Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 258 (2002). 
  62 See generally, John D. Perovich, Validity of Requirement that Candidate or Public Of-
ficer Have Been Resident of Governmental Unit for Specified Period. 65 A.L.R.3d 1048 
(originally published in 1975) (considering a broad array of federal and state cases where 
durational residency requirements have been challenged). 
  63 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
  64 Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143. 
  65 Id. at 144. 
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illustrates the Equal Protection Clause analysis.  The analysis begins 
with the threshold issue of whether a rational basis or a strict scrutiny 
standard is applicable; the former only requires a rational justification 
for the law, while the latter requires a compelling state interest for 
it.66  The differing level of scrutiny between the two standards is sub-
stantial, with courts inclined to defer to a state’s regulatory interest 
under the rational basis test67 as opposed to the more exacting review 
that accompanies a strict scrutiny standard.68 
Considering the Equal Protection Clause analyses of cases 
such as Bullock, the Court in Anderson delineated a balancing ap-
proach which it used in lieu of the equal protection analysis.69  Es-
chewing the notion that a constitutional challenge to a state election 
law could be resolved in a formulaic manner, the Court laid out its 
analytical blueprint: 
A court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical 
process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation.  It 
must first consider the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate.  It then must identify and evaluate the pre-
 
  66 Id. at 142.  See also Natl. Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 438 (1963) (“The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling 
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate 
can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (“The rigorous-
ness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to 
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights . . . when 
those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to 
advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ ” (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 
279, 289 (1992))). 
  67 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (“Nevertheless, the state’s important regulatory interests are 
generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”). 
  68 See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147 (“In addition to the State’s purported interest in regulating 
the ballot, the filing fees serve to relieve the State treasury of the cost of conducting the pri-
mary elections, and this is a legitimate state objective; in this limited sense it cannot be said 
that the fee system lacks a rational basis.  But under the standard of review [strict scrutiny] 
we consider applicable to this case, there must be a showing of necessity.”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
  69 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 n.7 (“In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause 
analysis.  We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting 
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  In addition to Bullock, the 
Court in Anderson also specifically mentioned Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), 
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), and Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Work-
ers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979), as cases that it relied on in fashioning its alternative analysis. 
10
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cise interests put forward by the State as justifications 
for the burden imposed by its rule.  In passing judg-
ment, the Court must not only determine the legitima-
cy and strength of each of those interests; it also must 
consider the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.  Only after 
weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a 
position to decide whether the challenged provision is 
unconstitutional.70 
The constitutional challenge facing the Court in Anderson 
stemmed from an early filing requirement for independent candidates 
running for United States President.71  Weighing the voter onus 
against the state interests served, and considering the importance of a 
presidential election, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the Ohio 
statute’s exclusionary effect on independent voters outweighed the 
interests proffered by the state.72  In contrast, the dissent focused on 
the rational nature of the laws and their allowance of reasonable ac-
cess for independent candidates, urging restraint from interference 
with Article II grants.73 
The split in the Court’s decision could be seen as a byproduct 
of the alternative, more equivocal, analysis that it applied.  Whereas 
an Equal Protection Clause analysis is more structured and demands a 
certain standard of review, the balancing analysis used by the Court 
in Anderson allows for more discretion regarding the depth of review 
applied to the suspect law, and lacks the guidance afforded by an 
analysis that is led by a prearranged standard.74  Indeed, as the scion 
of this seminal case make clear, Anderson’s balancing analysis has 
proven especially conducive to varying interpretations.  New York’s 
novel application of the analysis in Walsh follows this trend. 
 
  70 Id. at 789. 
  71 Id. at 782. 
  72 Id. at 806. 
  73 Id. at 806-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
  74 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (calling the Anderson test an “amorphous ‘flexible standard’ ” (quoting Burdick, 
504 U.S. at 428)).  See also Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the 
Supreme Court’s Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2005) (claiming 
that the Anderson analysis is more flexible and expressly provides judges with the tools to 
undertake a more thorough analysis). 
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IV. NEW YORK’S MODIFIED APPROACH 
The Court of Appeals’ approach in Walsh signals a departure 
from its previous, and arguably less ambiguous, mode of analysis, 
which was based predominantly on the federal Equal Protection 
Clause analysis.  While previous New York cases concerning election 
laws continued to apply an equal protection analysis in spite of the 
evolving federal jurisprudence, the court in Walsh, so to speak, “up-
dated” its analysis.75  In Walsh, the Court of Appeals adopted the 
Equal Protection Clause analysis utilized by the United States Su-
preme Court in cases such as Bullock, but relied on the balancing test 
from Anderson in order to establish the appropriate standard of re-
view.76  However, because of the ambiguity that accompanies the 
Anderson analysis,77 this altered analytical framework added a layer 
of opacity to the New York approach. 
Although this analysis will require further application to ef-
fectively flesh out its nuances, the court in Walsh gave some indica-
tion of what its interpretation of Anderson entails.  Specifically, the 
court’s use of the language “In sum, a court’s inquiry into the propri-
ety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a chal-
lenged regulation directly infringes upon First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights,”78 is nearly verbatim to the Supreme Court’s lan-
guage in Burdick,79 a decision that Justice Scalia interpreted as clari-
fying the Anderson test.80  Additionally, the New York court’s appli-
cation of its analysis is very similar to Justice Scalia’s interpretation 
of the Burdick decision expounded upon in his concurring decision in 
 
  75 See Golden, at 623 (applying equal protection analysis, and forgoing Anderson analysis, 
to city charter prohibiting high city officers from holding political office as a requisite for 
their holding public office; decided seven years after Anderson decision). 
  76 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 754. 
  77 See generally Burdick, 504 U.S. 428 (disagreeing over what Anderson test entails); 
Crawford, 553 U.S. 181 (illustrating disagreement among concurring and dissenting opin-
ions regarding how Anderson test should be objectified). 
  78 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758. 
  79 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (“Under this standard [Anderson analysis], the rigorous-
ness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to 
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”). 
  80 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Burdick forged Anderson’s 
amorphous ‘flexible standard’ into something resembling an administrable rule.”).  But see 
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 n.8 (reaffirming the original Anderson balancing test and stating 
that “[c]ontrary to Justice S[calia]’s suggestion . . . our approach remains faithful to Ander-
son and Burdick.”). 
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Crawford.81  Thus, Justice Scalia’s concurrence would seem to offer 
a more lucid understanding of what the New York approach to this 
issue may entail.  However, when considering the guidance that Jus-
tice Scalia attached to assessing the burden,82 as well as the admon-
ishments from Dusch and Dallas County,83 it is evident that the New 
York court, while ostensibly relying to an extent on federal rationale, 
was reluctant to carry that rationale as far as its language permitted.  
Indeed, the New York court’s injection of the Anderson analysis car-
ried with it the flexible ambiguities, and analytical opportunities, en-
demic to the textual makeup of that test.  As one scholar aptly stated, 
“The Anderson test already contains . . . most of the inquiries neces-
sary for such a thorough and detailed analysis. . . .  [T]he tools for a 
more rigorous analysis of ballot-access restrictions are clearly availa-
ble; the question is only whether courts will choose to make use of 
them.”84  The court’s scant examination of the rationale behind the 
residency requirement exhibited a reluctance to fully engage in An-
derson’s thorough analysis.  Considering that the test’s analytical 
flexibility affords a more thorough treatment, the Court of Appeals’ 
failure to employ that rigor displayed a firm deferential posture. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals’ approach to this issue modifies 
the federal analysis in a manner that yields a more lenient application.  
It gives minimal consideration to the federal notion that certain traits 
of an election law may stretch a rational basis standard to its limits, 
triggering greater review than that standard traditionally entails, or 
even tipping the standard at its threshold to one of “strict scrutiny.”85  
 
  81 Compare Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758 (utilizing Anderson analysis to establish the appro-
priate level of rigor to be used in the inquiry), with Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Since Burdick, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the primacy of its two-track ap-
proach. . . .  [T]he first step is to decide whether a challenged law severely burdens the right 
to vote.”) (citations omitted). 
  82 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Burdens are severe if they go be-
yond the merely inconvenient.”); Id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the burden 
stemming from the regulation should be measured by its “likely impact”) (quoting Storer v. 
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)).  In the case of Walsh, the “likely impact” of the regula-
tion, practically considered, is the strong dissuasion of non-Fishers Island residents from 
running for that seat.  The heavy burden of taking up residency on the island translates into a 
significant reduction of potential candidates, which significantly burdens voting rights. 
  83 See supra Part II.C. 
  84 Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the Supreme Court’s Un-
derstanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2005) (emphasis added). 
  85 See Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 480 (warning that indications of unequal representation 
may compel different results).  See also Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143 (“In approaching candidate 
restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact 
13
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This cautionary ethos is further supplemented by the Supreme 
Court’s language in Crawford, which, applying the Anderson balanc-
ing analysis, cautioned that “[h]owever slight that burden [resulting 
from a state election law] may appear[,] . . . it must be justified by 
relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify 
the limitation.’ ”86  In contrast to this fluid analysis, the Court of Ap-
peals’ treatment of Anderson indicated an inevitably dichotomous 
outcome, resulting in either “strict scrutiny” or “rational basis” re-
view, and an inclination to accept the legislative justification if it 
evinced a colorable rationale.87  This narrow usage of Anderson’s 
language to establish a standard of review,88 coupled with the failure 
to address the federal warnings attached to the decision,89 resulted in 
an approach that exhibits an overly deferential posture towards legis-
lative action and accepts legislative rationale at face value.  Alleviat-
ing the rigidness inherent in pre-conceived standards is the main utili-
ty of the Anderson analysis, which seeks to achieve an adequate 
balance between voting rights and the regulatory interests that are 
necessary to maintain those rights.90  While the New York court’s 
“two-track”91 analytical framework helped elucidate a very abstract 
subject, its attendant rationale failed to redress the factual merits.92  
 
on voters.”). 
  86 Bullock, 405 U.S. at 191 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89). 
  87 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 759-60. 
  88 Id. at 758. 
  89 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (“Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot ac-
cess restrictions ‘to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.’  There-
fore, ‘[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the 
extent and nature of their impact on voters.’ ”) (citing Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143). 
  90 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing the legitimacy of 
regulatory and voting interests, particularly in how the former supports the latter, and ac-
knowledging the court’s preference of a balancing analysis over a pre-set level of scrutiny in 
order to better accommodate the two interests). 
  91 Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Burdick forged Anderson’s analysis into 
an administrable rule and created a “two-track” approach, the first step is assessing the bur-
den, and the second is applying the appropriate level of scrutiny, with severe burdens receiv-
ing “strict scrutiny”). 
  92 As previously mentioned, Justice Scalia’s “two-track” interpretation of Burdick is simi-
lar to the Court of Appeals’ analysis, which also uses a two-step approach.  Analytically, 
both initially seek to divide the analysis into one of two diametric standards of review.  The 
difference between the two analyses is in how the burden is assessed, with Justice Scalia 
stressing the burden should be measured by its “likely impact,” and the Court of Appeals 
seemingly relying more upon the legislative regulatory interest.  Regardless, however, both 
are flawed in their interpretation of Anderson’s analysis, which remains a flexible analysis 
and not one that requires rigid standards of review; that standard is “rational basis” or “def-
erential important regulatory interests.”  See id. at 190 n.8 (“Contrary to Justice Scalia’s sug-
14
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Rather, the Court of Appeals should retain this framework, but with a 
rationale more in line with Anderson and its progeny.93  Its restraint 
was inconsistent with the language that it relied upon to determine 
the scope of its review.94  Merit would have been better served had 
the court carried out its analysis in a more liberal manner, which 
would have been consistent with the language it used in fashioning its 
approach.95 
A. The Implications of the Modified Approach 
The facts of Walsh seem to trigger the warning signs that the 
various Supreme Court decisions attached to the analyses adopted by 
the Court of Appeals.  However, because of the court’s restrained 
level of review, the circumstances of the Walsh residency require-
ment that would likely raise flags under a federal approach do not re-
ceive much attention under the New York court’s analysis.  For ex-
ample, the residency requirement appears to be a significant deterrent 
for any non-Fishers Island resident, as it entails the burden of relocat-
ing if elected to that seat on the town board;96 in limiting their candi-
dates, this deterrent has more than a minimal impact on the voters’ 
rights.  The rationale behind this aspect of the law would certainly 
warrant a deeper review under federal interpretations of the Anderson 
 
gestion our approach remains faithful to Anderson and Burdick. . . .  To be sure, Burdick re-
jected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to all laws imposing a burden on the right to 
vote; but in its place, the Court applied the ‘flexible standard’ set forth in Anderson.  Burdick 
surely did not create a novel ‘deferential important regulatory interests’ standard.’ ”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
  93 See generally Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (“Our primary concern is with the tendency of 
ballot access restrictions ‘to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.’ 
Therefore, ‘[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic 
light the extent and nature of their impact on voters.’ ”) (citing Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143); 
Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89 (holding there must be a corresponding state interest that is 
“sufficiently weighty” to justify limiting a party’s access to the ballot); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 
434 (holding that a court must evaluate “the extent to which those [state regulatory] interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.”); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (Rather than 
applying any ‘litmus test’ that would neatly separate valid from invalid restrictions . . . a 
court must identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule . . . and make the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system de-
mands). 
  94 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (“Rather than applying any ‘litmus test’ that would neatly 
separate valid from invalid restrictions . . . a court must identify and evaluate the interests 
put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, and then make 
the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system demands.”) (emphasis added). 
  95 See supra note 81; discussion infra part IV.A. 
  96 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758-59. 
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analysis.97  However, New York appears content with merely exam-
ining the veneer of legislative rationale, a disposition that seems at 
odds with the more flexible analysis it put in place.  Furthermore, in 
Walsh, the justification for the residency requirement was based on a 
lack of connection between the Fishers Island residents and the main-
land.98  However, since the time of the residency requirement’s re-
enactment in 1977,99 there has been a substantial advance in commu-
nications technology, thus indicating that the reasons for the require-
ment may be anachronistic.  Notwithstanding this indication, the 
Court of Appeals failed to give any consideration to the modern ne-
cessity of the residency requirement.  Walsh displayed a firm aver-
sion to submitting ballot access laws, and, presumably, the broader 
class of election laws subject to this modified approach, to thorough 
analytical review.  Such an inclination, as Walsh demonstrates, may 
result in the omission of key factual inquiries. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because it is not entirely clear how much consideration the 
Court of Appeals gave to federal indications of what may drive a 
candidacy restriction into the realm of unconstitutionality, the success 
of future challenges to election laws and candidacy restrictions did 
not gain much certainty in New York.  However, this absence of con-
sideration combined with the Court’s adoption of different federal 
approaches, and also its heavy reliance on federal case law, leaves 
room for significant malleability in future challenges, which may be 
successful if these warnings are prominently placed in their makeup.  
Furthermore, the ambiguity inherent in the language of the Anderson 
test, as well as the general uncertainty surrounding what exactly it en-
tails,100 leaves ample room for creative reasoning.  The apparent per-
 
  97 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (interpreting Anderson as requiring state justifications 
that are “sufficiently weighty” to justify candidate ballot access restrictions) (quoting Nor-
man, 502 U.S. at 289)); Id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he severity of the burden of a 
regulation should be measured according to its ‘nature, extent, and likely impact.’ ”) (quoting 
Storer, 415 U.S. at 738)); Id. at 210-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing Anderson 
analysis as a “sliding-scale balancing analysis” that demands “hard facts”). 
  98 Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 755. 
  99 Id. at 756. 
  100 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The lead opinion’s record-
based resolution of these cases, which neither rejects nor embraces the rule of our prece-
dents, provides no certainty, and will embolden litigants who surmise that our precedents 
have been abandoned.”); See also Bryan P. Jensen, Crawford v. Marion County Election 
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functory consideration of federal caveats by the Court of Appeals 
does not foreclose their use in future New York cases of this variety.  
Rather, it is prudent to recognize that the nascent Walsh analysis has 
yet to be refined by the Court of Appeals, and is borne out of con-
flicting jurisprudence on the federal level.  Consequently, the Court 
of Appeals’ initial treatment of the matter may be a product of the 
federal tumult still attached to the Anderson analysis, a response to an 
ineffectively argued challenge, or an inclination to withhold more 
thorough analysis.  Equivocation clouds this analysis in its infancy.  
Only repeated exhibition will bear a more lucid account of what this 






Board: The Missed Opportunity to Remedy the Ambiguity and Unpredictability of Burdick, 
86 DENV. U. L. REV. 535 (2009) (“The Court had the opportunity to resolve the ambiguity 
and unpredictability resulting from prior decisions [referring to Anderson analysis;] . . . how-
ever, the plurality opinions reached that conclusion by very different reasoning.”). 
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